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Abstract
Secret sharing schemes are said to be d-multiplicative if the i-th shares of any d secrets s(j), j ∈ [d]
can be converted into an additive share of the product
∏
j∈[d] s
(j). d-Multiplicative secret sharing
is a central building block of multiparty computation protocols with minimum number of rounds
which are unconditionally secure against possibly non-threshold adversaries. It is known that
d-multiplicative secret sharing is possible if and only if no d forbidden subsets covers the set of all the
n players or, equivalently, it is private with respect to an adversary structure of type Qd. However,
the only known method to achieve d-multiplicativity for any adversary structure of type Qd is based
on CNF secret sharing schemes, which are not efficient in general in that the information ratios are
exponential in n.
In this paper, we explicitly construct a d-multiplicative secret sharing scheme for any `-partite
adversary structure of type Qd whose information ratio is O(n`+1). Our schemes are applicable to
the class of all the `-partite adversary structures, which is much wider than that of the threshold
ones. Furthermore, our schemes achieve information ratios which are polynomial in n if ` is constant
and hence are more efficient than CNF schemes. In addition, based on the standard embedding of
`-partite adversary structures into R`, we introduce a class of `-partite adversary structures of type
Qd with good geometric properties and show that there exist more efficient d-multiplicative secret
sharing schemes for adversary structures in that family than the above general construction. The
family of adversary structures is a natural generalization of that of the threshold ones and includes
some adversary structures which arise in real-world scenarios.
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1 Introduction
Secret sharing is a cryptographic technique introduced in [4, 20] to protect a secret from
leakage by dividing it into several shares and distributing them to n players. Let P be the
set of the n players. A subset of players is called forbidden if it reveals no information on
the secret and authorized if it determines the secret. In this paper, we only consider perfect
secret sharing, in which each subset is either forbidden or authorized. For a family of subsets
of players ∆ ⊆ 2P , we say that a secret sharing scheme is ∆-private if any subset in ∆ is
forbidden. The efficiency of a secret sharing scheme is measured by the (total) information
ratio, which is defined as the ratio of the total size of shares to that of a secret.
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In addition to its direct application to distributed storage of secret data, secret sharing is
a central buiding block of unconditionally secure multiparty computation protocols. Secure
multiparty computation (MPC) is an important problem in cryptography, in which several
players jointly compute an agreed function over their inputs without revealing no information
on them to an adversary. More precisely, we assume that there are m clients holding their
secret inputs xj ∈ F, j ∈ [m] := {1, 2, . . . ,m} represented as elements in some finite field F
and n servers who help the computation of the function. Furthermore, a (passive) adversary
corrupts a subset of servers and learns the entire internal information of the corrupted servers.
We identify the set of servers with P and let ∆ ⊆ 2P denote the family of all subsets of
servers which the adversary can corrupt, which we call the adversary structure.
Barkol et al. [1] show that it is possible to construct a protocol with two rounds of
interaction, which is the minimum number of rounds, to securely evaluate a multivariate
polynomial of total degree at most d if there exists a ∆-private secret sharing scheme
satisfying an additional property called d-multiplicativity. A secret sharing scheme is said
to be d-multiplicative if the i-th shares of any d secrets s(j), j ∈ [d] can be converted into
an element ci such that the sum
∑
i∈[n] ci is equal to the product
∏
j∈[d] s
(j). Note that the
dominant term of the communication complexity in the protocol is mσ log |F|, where m is
the number of clients and σ is the information ratio of the underlying secret sharing scheme.
Barkol et al. [1] also characterize the existence of d-multiplicative secret sharing schemes:
∆-private d-multiplicative secret sharing is possible if and only if ∆ is of type Qd. An adversary
structure ∆ is called a Qd-adversary structure if A1 ∪ · · · ∪Ad 6= P for any A1, . . . , Ad ∈ ∆.
In particular, if we focus on the adversary who can corrupt any subset of k servers, i.e.,
∆ = T nk := {A ⊆ P : |A| ≤ k}, then T nk -private d-multiplicative secret sharing is possible if
and only if n > dk. The “if” part follows from the (k, n)-Shamir secret sharing scheme [20],
which is based on Lagrange interpolation for some polynomial over any finite field F with
|F| > n. It is known that Shamir’s scheme achieves the optimal information ratio [16]. On the
other hand, since it costs a lot to control a single server, the number of servers n should be
as small as possible. The above characterization implies that we must consider non-threshold
Qd-adversary structures to design d-multiplicative secret sharing among n ≤ dk players.
For any (possibly non-threshold) adversary structure ∆ of type Qd, the CNF secret
sharing scheme [15] for ∆ is known to be d-multiplicative. However, the CNF scheme is
inefficient in general since its information ratio is
∑
i∈P |∆+i |, which is exponential in n in
the worst case. Here, ∆+i denotes the set of all the maximal subsets in ∆ not containing the
player i ∈ P . This large information ratio of the CNF scheme leads to a large amount of
communication when the scheme is used in the protocol. Therefore, it is important to devise
a method to construct efficient d-multiplicative secret sharing schemes for non-threshold
Qd-adversary structures.
Besides Shamir’s scheme and CNF schemes, several multiplicative secret sharing schemes
have been proposed. The notion of an arithmetic codex is introduced in [7]. Arithmetic
codices are defined as linear codes with some multiplicative property and can be used as
d-multiplicative secret sharing schemes. In particular, arithmetic codices based on algebraic
geometric codes [8] are important. Let d and k be any positive integers and assume that
C is an algebraic curve of genus g(C) defined over F. If dk + 2dg(C) < n < |C(F)|, then
there exists a T nk -private d-multiplicative secret sharing scheme over F. Here, C(F) is the set
of all F-rational places on C. Although we need additional 2dg(C) players, the condition
|C(F)| > n is weaker than |F| > n.
R. Eriguchi and N. Kunihiro 2:3
2-Multiplicative secret sharing schemes have received a lot of attention. For general
adversary structures, one of the most significant results is that any linear secret sharing
scheme for a Q2-adversary structure can be converted into a 2-multiplicative scheme for the
same adversary structure [9]. Since the information ratio of the resulting scheme is twice
that of the initial scheme, it achieves 2λF(∆), where λF(∆) is the minimum information ratio
of ∆-private linear secret sharing schemes. In [17, 18], more efficient 2-multiplicative schemes
are proposed for specific classes of Q2-adversary structures.
1.1 Our Results
In this paper, we focus on multipartite adversary structures. The class of multipartite
adversary structures has been well studied because they correspond to many realistic situations
and can be described in a compact way. Please refer to [12] for a comprehensive survey of
multipartite adversary structures. For a partition Π = (P1, . . . , P`) of P , Π-partite adversary
structures are defined as the ones in which each player is classified into some part Pj and all
players in the same part play an equivalent role. There is a useful geometric representation
[11]: any Π-partite adversary structure can be embedded in R` via the map ΦΠ : 2P → R`,
ΦΠ(X) = (|X∩P1|, . . . , |X∩P`|). In particular, a Π-partite adversary structure ∆ is uniquely
determined by max ΦΠ(∆), where max ΦΠ(∆) is the set of all maximal elements in ΦΠ(∆)
with respect to the coordinatewise order on R`.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. First, for any `-partite adversary structure
∆ of type Qd, we explicitly construct a ∆-private d-multiplicative secret sharing scheme whose
information ratio is n|max ΦΠ(∆)| = O(n`+1) (Theorem 4). The scheme can be defined
over any finite field F with |F| > n. It is obtained by a simple application of well-known
decomposition techniques [21]. However, to our best knowledge, this is the first time to
prove that the scheme satisfies d-multiplicativity if ∆ is of type Qd. As a result, we obtain
d-multiplicative schemes for the class of all the `-partite adversary structures of type Qd,
which is much wider than that of the threshold ones. Furthermore, our schemes achieve
information ratios which are polynomial in n if ` is constant and hence are more efficient
than CNF schemes.
Second, we show that there exists a more efficient ∆-private d-multiplicative secret
sharing scheme than the scheme from the above general construction if ΦΠ(∆) has some
good geometric property (Theorem 9). Specifically, let C = Conv(ΦΠ(∆)) be the convex hull
of ΦΠ(∆) in R` and set p = (1/d)ΦΠ(P ). Assume that p /∈ C. If dist(p, C), the distance
between p and C, is at least  > 0, then ∆ is of type Qd and it is possible to construct a
∆-private d-multiplicative scheme whose information ratio is at most O(`n2/) over a finite
field F with |F| = Ω(`n2/). For example, if  is a constant independent of n, then the
information ratio is smaller than that of the above general construction.
The information ratio of our scheme depends only on the distance between the point p
and the convex hull of ΦΠ(∆). In other words, our scheme provides the same upper bound
on the minimum information ratio of ∆-private secret sharing schemes regardless of how the
adversary structure ∆ is represented. We demonstrate an example of adversary structures
(Example 11) for which an upper bound obtained by a naive approach based on weighted
threshold secret sharing would grow infinitely depending on the description of ∆.
Our construction for such ∆ is a natural generalization of Shamir’s scheme. Indeed, when
∆ = T nk , the condition p /∈ C holds if and only if n > dk and then our scheme is the same as
the (k, n)-Shamir secret sharing scheme.
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Table 1 Comparison amongst existing d-multiplicative secret sharing schemes. The symbol
“d = ∗” denotes any value of d.
Scheme d Adversary structure Information ratio Assumption on F
Shamir [20] ∗ T nk with n > dk n |F| > n
Chen and Cramer [8] ∗ T nk with n > dk + 2dg(C) n |C(F)| > n
CNF [15] ∗ ∆ of type Qd
∑
i∈P |∆+i | –
Cramer et al. [9] 2 ∆ of type Q2 2λF(∆) –
Theorem 4 ∗ `-partite ∆ of type Qd n|max ΦΠ(∆)| |F| > n
Theorem 9 ∗ `-partite ∆ such that
dist(p,Conv(ΦΠ(∆))) ≥  O(`n
2/) |F| = Ω(`n2/)
1.2 Our Techniques
Let Π = (P1, . . . , P`) be a partition of P and ∆ be any Π-partite adversary structure of
type Qd. First, we explain a high-level idea of our proposed construction of a ∆-private
d-multiplicative secret sharing scheme using decomposition techniques [21].
Write max ΦΠ(∆) = {a1, . . . ,aN} and aj = (aj(1), . . . ,aj(`)). For each j ∈ [N ], define
∆j as the Π-partite adversary structure such that ΦΠ(∆j) = {x ∈ ΦΠ(2P ) : x  aj}, where
 is the coordinatewise order on R`. Then we can decompose ∆ into N adversary structures
∆1, . . . ,∆N as ∆ =
⋃
j∈[N ] ∆j .
We construct a ∆-private scheme Σ as follows. Let F be a finite field with |F| > n and
fix n distinct nonzero elements α1, . . . , αn ∈ F. Let s ∈ F be a secret to be shared. We
randomly split s into s1, . . . , sN , i.e., s = s1 + · · · + sN . For each j ∈ [N ] and i ∈ [`], we
run the (aj(i), |Pi|)-Shamir secret sharing scheme with secret sj in parallel. In other words,
we assign to each player k ∈ Pi the evaluation of some polynomial fij with fij(0) = sj of
degree at most aj(i) at the point αk. Then the player k ∈ Pi receives N field elements
{si,j,k := fij(αk) : j ∈ [N ]}. As for privacy, if A ∈ ∆, then ΦΠ(A)  aj for some j ∈ [N ]
and the players in A cannot obtain any information about sj and hence the secret s. Since
each player receives N field elements for a secret s ∈ F, the information ratio of Σ is nN .
To prove the scheme Σ is d-multiplicative, let s(1), . . . , s(d) be d secrets. Since we split s(m)
into s(m)1 , . . . , s
(m)
N , the product s(1) · · · s(d) can be represented as the sum of Nd monomials
{s(1)j1 · · · s
(d)
jd
: j1 ∈ [N ], . . . , jd ∈ [N ]}. It follows from ∆ being of type Qd that, for any tuple
(j1, . . . , jd), there exists an index i ∈ [`] such that aj1(i) + · · ·+ajd(i) < |Pi|. Let (j1, . . . , jd)
be any tuple and i be such an index. From the definition of the (ajm(i), |Pi|)-Shamir secret
sharing scheme, it can be observed that s(m)jm is the evaluation of some polynomial of degree
at most ajm(i) at the point 0. Then the monomial s
(1)
j1
· · · s(d)jd is the evaluation of some
polynomial f of degree at most aj1(i) + · · · + ajd(i) at the point 0. Each player k in Pi
can obtain the evaluation of f at the point αk by multiplying their shares s(1)i,j1,k, . . . , s
(d)
i,jd,k
.
Since there are more than ajm(i) + · · ·+ ajd(i) players in Pi, the monomial s(1)j1 · · · s
(d)
jd
can
be obtained from their shares by Lagrange interpolation. Finally, the product s(1) · · · s(d)
can be obtained by doing this process for all the Nd tuple (j1, . . . , jd).
Next, let ∆ be a Π-partite adversary structure with dist(p, C) ≥  > 0, where p =
(1/d)ΦΠ(P ) and C = Conv(ΦΠ(∆)). We explain how to prove the existence of a ∆-private
d-multiplicative secret sharing scheme whose information ratio is O(`n2/). Roughly speaking,
we show that ∆ is contained by some weighted threshold adversary structure. For a vector
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of non-negative integers w and a non-negative integer t, the weighted threshold adversary
structure WΠw,t is defined as the Π-partite adversary structure such that ΦΠ(WΠw,t) = {x ∈
ΦΠ(2P ) : w · x ≤ t}, where w · x is the standard inner product in R`. If w · ΦΠ(P ) > dt, it
is possible to construct a WΠw,t-private d-multiplicative scheme whose information ratio is
w · ΦΠ(P ) by assigning multiple shares of Shamir’s scheme to each player [20].
More precisely, let c∗ be the closest point in C to p and h be the unit vector which is
parallel to p−c∗. Then it can be verified that h · (x−p) ≤ − for any x ∈ ΦΠ(∆). Although
h is not necessarily a non-negative integer vector, we can approximate it by a vector h′
such that all the entries are rational numbers with common denominator q = O(`n/) and
h′ · (x − p) < 0 for any x ∈ ΦΠ(∆). By setting w = qh′ and t = maxx∈ΦΠ(∆){w · x}, we
have that ∆ ⊆ WΠw,t. Since dt < w · ΦΠ(P ) and each entry of w can be upper bounded
by q = O(`n/), we obtain a ∆-private d-multiplicative scheme Σ with information ratio
O(`n2/).
1.3 Related Work
There is another kind of MPC protocols based on secret sharing, in which the function to be
computed is represented as an arithmetic circuit and servers interactively evaluate it gate by
gate. In the threshold setting, the protocol in [3] is classically known and a more efficient
protocol is proposed in [10]. For a non-threshold adversary, Cramer et al. [9] construct an
MPC protocol based on 2-multiplicative secret sharing schemes and Maurer [19] and Hirt
and Tschudi [14] construct protocols based on CNF secret sharing schemes. Their protocols
are secure against an adversary whose adversary structure is of type Q2 (or Q3 in the setting
with perfect active security) and hence they are more flexible than that of [1]. However, the
servers need to interact with each other whenever they evaluate a multiplication gate.
d-Multiplicative secret sharing can also be defined in the context of homomorphic secret
sharing. Recently, several homomorphic secret sharing schemes have been proposed in the
literature (e.g. [5, 6]). However, the security of the schemes relies on some computational
assumptions.
1.4 Notations
Let Z+ and R+ denote the set of all non-negative integers and the set of all non-negative
real numbers, respectively. Define [`] = {1, . . . , `} for ` ∈ N. Let P = {p1, . . . , pn} be the set
of n players. The power set of a set X is denoted by 2X and Xm is the Cartesian product of
m copies of X. Let F be any field. The vector 1 ∈ Fm is the vector whose entries are all one
and ei ∈ Fm is the i-th unit vector, i.e., the vector such that the i-th entry is one and the
other entries are all zero. The i-th component of v is denoted by v(i). For two real vectors
v,w ∈ Rm, we write v  w if v(i) ≤ w(i) for any i ∈ [m] and v ≺ w if v  w and v 6= w.
The standard inner product of v and w is v ·w = v(1)w(1) + · · ·+ v(m)w(m). The length
of v ∈ Rm is measured by the Euclidean norm: ‖v‖ = √v · v. For two closed subsets C1 and
C2 in Rm, the distance between C1 and C2 is defined by dist(C1, C2) = min{‖c1− c2‖ : c1 ∈
C1, c2 ∈ C2}.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Adversary Structures
A family ∆ of subsets of P is monotone decreasing if A ∈ ∆ and A ⊇ B implies B ∈ ∆ for
any A,B ⊆ P . We call a monotone decreasing family of subsets of P an adversary structure
on P .
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Let ∆ be an adversary structure on P and d ≥ 2. We say that ∆ is of type Qd if
A1 ∪ · · · ∪Ad 6= P for any A1, . . . , Ad ∈ ∆.
The (k, n)-threshold adversary structure T nk is the most well-known adversary structure,
which is defined by T nk = {A ⊆ P : |A| ≤ k}. It can be seen that T nk is of type Qd if and
only if n > dk.
Let Π = (P1, . . . , P`) be a partition of P , i.e., Pi ∩ Pj = ∅ for i 6= j and P =
⋃
j∈[`] Pj . A
permutation τ on P is called a Π-permutation if τ(Pj) = Pj for any j ∈ [`]. An adversary
structure ∆ is called Π-partite if τ(B) ∈ ∆ for any B ∈ ∆ and any Π-permutation τ . There
is a useful geometric representation of Π-partite adversary structures. Let ΦΠ : 2P → R` be a
map defined by ΦΠ(X) = (|X∩Pj |)j∈[`]. The image of ΦΠ is the set of all integer points in the
hyperrectangle determined by 0 and ΦΠ(P ), that is, ΦΠ(2P ) = {x ∈ Z` : 0  x  ΦΠ(P )}.
It follows that a Π-partite adversary structure ∆ is uniquely determined by ΦΠ(∆). Note
that, if a ∈ ΦΠ(∆) and a  b, then b ∈ ΦΠ(∆) for any a, b ∈ ΦΠ(2P ). Thus, any Π-partite
adversary structure ∆ is uniquely determined only by specifying max ΦΠ(∆), where
max ΦΠ(∆) := {a ∈ ΦΠ(∆) : a ≺ b  ΦΠ(P )⇒ b /∈ ΦΠ(∆)}.
2.2 Secure Polynomial Evaluation Based on d-Multiplicative Secret
Sharing
We provide the definition of d-multiplicative secret sharing and an MPC protocol proposed
in [1] to securely evaluate a multivariate polynomial.
A secret sharing scheme [2] is a tuple Σ = (K,R,S, ϕ), where K is a domain of secrets,
R is a set of random strings, S is a domain of shares, and ϕ : K ×R → Sn is a map. For
A ⊆ P , ϕ(s, r)A denotes the restriction of ϕ(s, r) to the entries indexed by A. For each
i ∈ P , we define Si ⊆ S as Si = {ϕ(s, r){i} : s ∈ K, r ∈ R}. The (total) information ratio
σ(Σ) is defined as σ(Σ) =
∑
i∈P log |Si|/ log |K|.
We say that a secret sharing scheme Σ = (K,R,S, ϕ) is private with respect to an
adversary structure ∆ on P or ∆-private for short if, for any A ∈ ∆, any two secrets s, t ∈ K,
and any possible tuple of shares (xi)i∈A, it holds that
Pr[ϕ(s, r)A = (xi)i∈A] = Pr[ϕ(t, r)A = (xi)i∈A],
where the probabilities are taken over the random choice of r ∈ R. In other words, the
players in A ∈ ∆ cannot obtain any information about a secret. Clearly, if Σ is ∆1-private
and ∆1 ⊇ ∆2, then Σ is also ∆2-private.
Suppose that K is a finite field F. For d ≥ 2, a secret sharing scheme Σ is said to be
d-multiplicative if there exists a map MULT : P × Sd → F such that∏
j∈[d]
s(j) =
∑
i∈P
MULT(i, s(1)i , . . . , s
(d)
i ),
for any d secrets s(1), . . . , s(d) ∈ F and any d random strings r(1), . . . , r(d) ∈ R, where
(s(j)i )i∈P = ϕ(s(j), r(j)) is a vector of shares for s(j). Furthermore, we say that a secret
sharing scheme Σ is linear over F or F-linear if S and R are vector spaces over K = F and ϕ
is a linear map over F.
The most important application of d-multiplicative secret sharing is a construction of
unconditionally secure MPC protocols to evaluate multivariate polynomials of total degree
at most d.
Suppose that m clients Cj have secret inputs x(j) ∈ F and want to evaluate a multivariate
polynomial f ∈ F[X1, . . . , Xm] of total degree at most d. Furthermore, suppose that there
are n servers indexed by P which help perform the computation. Let Σ = (K = F,R,S, ϕ)
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be a d-multiplicative secret sharing scheme. Barkol et al. [1] construct an MPC protocol to
obtain f(x(1), . . . , x(m)) by using Σ. For simplicity, we explain the protocol in the case of
m = d and f = X1 . . . Xd. Please refer to [1] for a general case.
Round 1: Each client Cj generates shares (s(j)i )i∈P = ϕ(x(j), r(j)) corresponding to his
input x(j) and sends s(j)i ∈ Si ⊆ S to the server i ∈ P . In addition, Cj randomly chooses
n field elements z(j)i , i ∈ P conditioned on
∑
i∈P z
(j)
i = 0 and sends z
(j)
i ∈ F to the server
i ∈ P .
Round 2: Each server i ∈ P computes yi = MULT(i, s(1)i , . . . , s(d)i ) +
∑
j∈[d] z
(j)
i and
sends yi ∈ F to all clients.
Output: Each client Cj computes
∑
i∈P yi, which is equal to
∏
j∈[d] x
(j).
Since the n servers can locally convert their shares into additive shares of the output,
interaction is required only in Round 1 and the latter half of Round 2. The communication
complexity of the protocol is∑
j∈[m]
∑
i∈P
(log |Si|+ log |F|) +
∑
i∈P
∑
j∈[m]
log |F| = m(σ(Σ) + 2n) log |F|.
Therefore, it is important to cut down the information ratio and the size of the base field to
design a communication-efficient MPC protocol.
Let ∆ ⊆ 2P be a family of subsets of the n servers. We assume a passive adversary who
can corrupt a set of servers A such that A ∈ ∆. If the underlying secret sharing scheme Σ is
∆-private, then the adversary cannot learn anything about the inputs of the clients other
than what follows from the output.
2.3 Examples of d-Multiplicative Secret Sharing Schemes
2.3.1 Shamir Secret Sharing Schemes
The (k, n)-Shamir secret sharing scheme [20] is a well-known T nk -private linear secret sharing
scheme. Let F be a finite field such that |F| > n and take n distinct nonzero elements
α1, . . . , αn ∈ F. Let s ∈ F be a secret to be shared. First, choose a random polynomial f
over F of degree at most k conditioned on f(0) = s. Second, assign f(αi) to i ∈ P as a
share. Note that the (k, n)-Shamir secret sharing scheme has the information ratio n, which
is known to be optimal [16].
It can be seen that the scheme is d-multplicative if n > dk. Indeed, let s(1), . . . , s(d) be
d secrets and f (1), . . . , f (d) be the corresponding d polynomials over F of degree at most k
which are used to share s(1), . . . , s(d), respectively. Since the degree of g :=
∏
j∈[d] f
(j) is at
most dk < n, we can compute the product of the secrets from the shares f (j)(αi), i ∈ P˜ for
any subset P˜ ⊆ P of size dk by Lagrange interpolation:∏
j∈[d]
s(j) = g(0) =
∑
i∈P˜
λP˜i g(αi) =
∑
i∈P˜
λP˜i
∏
j∈[d]
f (j)(αi),
where λP˜i is a Lagrange coefficient, i.e., λP˜i =
∏
m∈P˜\{i} αm/(αm − αi).
2.3.2 Weighted Threshold Secret Sharing Schemes
Weighted threshold adversary structures proposed in [20] are natural generalizations of the
threshold ones to the multipartite setting. Let Π = (P1, . . . , P`) be a partition of P , w ∈ Z`+,
and t ∈ Z+. Define WΠw,t as the Π-partite adversary structure such that
ΦΠ(WΠw,t) = {x ∈ ΦΠ(2P ) : w · x ≤ t}.
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Note that, if w = 1 ∈ Z`+, then WΠ1,t is equal to T nt .
It is possible to constructWΠw,t-private linear secret sharing schemes by assigning multiple
shares of Shamir’s scheme to each player [20]. Let F be a finite field such that |F| > N :=
w · ΦΠ(P ) and take N distinct nonzero elements αijk ∈ F for i ∈ [`], j ∈ Pi and k ∈ [w(i)].
Let s ∈ F be a secret to be shared. First, choose a random polynomial f over F of degree
at most t with f(0) = s. Second, assign w(i) shares (f(αijk))k∈[w(i)] to the player j ∈ P ,
where i is the unique index such that j ∈ Pi. Note that the information ratio of the scheme
is N = w ·ΦΠ(P ). It can be shown that the scheme is d-multiplicative if N > dt in the same
manner as Shamir’s scheme. In summary, the following proposition holds.
I Proposition 1 ([20]). Let Π = (P1, . . . , P`) be a partition of P and WΠw,t be the Π-partite
weighted threshold adversary structure with weight w ∈ Z`+ and threshold t ∈ Z+. Let F be
a finite field such that |F| > w · ΦΠ(P ). Then there exists a WΠw,t-private F-linear secret
sharing scheme Σ with information ratio σ(Σ) = w ·ΦΠ(P ). Furthermore, if w ·ΦΠ(P ) > dt,
then Σ is d-multiplicative.
2.3.3 CNF Secret Sharing Schemes
For any adversary structure ∆ of type Qd, it is possible to construct a ∆-private d-
multiplicative secret sharing scheme [15]. Let ∆+ be the set of all maximal subsets in
∆. Let s be a secret to be shared. First, choose |∆+| random field elements rA, A ∈ ∆+ such
that s =
∑
A∈∆+ rA. Second, assign (rA)A∈∆+i to each i ∈ P , where ∆
+
i = {A ∈ ∆+ : i /∈ A}.
The information ratio of the scheme is
∑
i∈P |∆+i |. It can be seen that the scheme is
d-multiplicative as long as ∆ is of type Qd.
3 d-Multiplicative Secret Sharing for Any Multipartite Qd-Adversary
Structure
In this section, we propose an explicit construction of a ∆-private d-multiplicative secret
sharing scheme for any `-partite adversary structure ∆ of type Qd. Our scheme achieves an
information ratio n|max ΦΠ(∆)| = O(n`+1). First, we restate the definition of Qd-adversary
structures in the multipartite setting.
I Proposition 2. Let Π = (P1, . . . , P`) be a partition of P and ∆ be a Π-partite adversary
structure on P . Then ∆ is of type Qd if and only if x1 + · · · + xd  ΦΠ(P ) for any (not
necessarily distinct) d points x1, . . . ,xd ∈ ΦΠ(∆).
Proof. First, assume that P is covered by d subsets B1, . . . , Bd ∈ ∆. Since ∆ is monotone
decreasing, we may assume that the Bi’s are pairwise distinct. Then it holds that ΦΠ(Bi) ∈
ΦΠ(∆) and ΦΠ(B1) + · · ·+ ΦΠ(Bd) = ΦΠ(P ).
Second, assume that there exists d points x1, . . . ,xd ∈ ΦΠ(∆) such that x1 + · · ·+ xd 
ΦΠ(P ). Since c′ ∈ ΦΠ(∆) if c ∈ ΦΠ(∆) and 0  c′  c, we can replace the xi’s with
d points b1, . . . , bd ∈ ΦΠ(∆) such that bi  xi and b1 + · · · + bd = ΦΠ(P ). Then there
exist pairwise disjoint d subsets B1, . . . , Bd in ∆ such that xi = ΦΠ(Bi). We have that
B1 ∪ · · · ∪Bd = P . J
Next, we explain the well-known decomposition technique [21], which is fundamental to
our construction of d-multiplicative schemes. Roughly speaking, if an adversary structure ∆
is decomposed into several adversary structures ∆i, then a ∆-private secret sharing scheme
can be obtained from secret sharing schemes each of which is ∆i-private. Specifically, let
R. Eriguchi and N. Kunihiro 2:9
∆1, . . . ,∆N be N adversary structures on P and set ∆∀ =
⋂
i∈[N ] ∆i and ∆∃ =
⋃
i∈[N ] ∆i.
Suppose that, for each i ∈ [N ], we are given a ∆i-private secret sharing scheme Σi =
(Ki,Ri,Si, ϕi). We assume that all domains of secrets Ki are identical to a finite field F.
In the following, we construct two secret sharing schemes Σ∀ and Σ∃ with domain of
secrets F which are private with respect to ∆∀ and ∆∃, respectively. Set R = R1 × · · · ×RN
and S = S1 × · · · × SN . Let s ∈ F be a secret to be shared. First, Σ∀ randomly chooses
r = (r1, . . . , rN ) from R and sets a vector of shares as ϕ(s, r) = (ϕ1(s, r1), . . . , ϕN (s, rN )) ∈
Sn. Equivalently, Σ∀ runs N secret sharing schemes Σi in parallel with secret s. Second,
Σ∃ randomly chooses r = (r1, . . . , rN ) from R and N − 1 elements s1, . . . , sN−1 from
F. Then it sets sN = s −
∑
i∈[N−1] si and a vector of shares as ϕ(s, (r, s1, . . . , sN−1)) =
(ϕ1(s1, r1), . . . , ϕN (sN , rN )) ∈ Sn. In other words, Σ∃ randomly splits s into s1, . . . , sN and
runs Σi in parallel with secret si for each i ∈ [N ]. Then the following proposition holds.
I Proposition 3 ([21]). Let F be a finite field. Let ∆1, . . . ,∆N be N adversary structures on
P and set ∆∀ =
⋂
i∈[N ] ∆i and ∆∃ =
⋃
i∈[N ] ∆i. Suppose that, for each i ∈ [N ], a ∆i-private
secret sharing scheme Σi = (F,Ri,Si, ϕi) is given. Then there exist a ∆∀-private secret
sharing scheme Σ∀ and a ∆∃-private secret sharing scheme Σ∃ both of which have information
ratios at most
∑
i∈[N ] σ(Σi).
Now, we are ready to provide our construction of d-multiplicative schemes. Let Π =
(P1, . . . , P`) be a partition of P and ∆ be a Π-partite adversary structure. Write max ΦΠ(∆) =
{a1, . . . ,aN}. We decompose ∆ into N adversary structures ∆1, . . . ,∆N as ∆ =
⋃
j∈[N ] ∆j ,
where ∆j is the Π-partite adversary structure such that ΦΠ(∆j) = {x ∈ ΦΠ(2P ) : x  aj}.
Furthermore, we decompose each ∆j into ` adversary structures ∆j1, . . . ,∆j` as ∆j =⋂
k∈[`] ∆jk, where ∆jk is the Π-partite adversary structure such that ΦΠ(∆jk) = {x ∈
ΦΠ(2P ) : x(k) ≤ aj(k)}.
For each ∆jk, we can construct a ∆jk-private scheme Σjk based on the (aj(k), |Pk|)-
Shamir secret sharing scheme. Indeed, let F be a finite field with |F| > n and fix n distinct
nonzero elements α1, . . . , αn ∈ F. For a secret s ∈ F, choose a random polynomial fjk of
degree at most aj(k) conditioned on fjk(0) = s and assign fjk(αi) ∈ F to each player i ∈ Pk.
In view of Proposition 3, we obtain a ∆j-private secret sharing scheme Σj from Σj1, . . . ,Σj`.
Since Σjk does not assign any share to players in Pk′ for k′ 6= k, the information ratio of
Σj is n. Again, from Proposition 3, we obtain a ∆-private secret sharing scheme Σ with
information ratio nN from Σ1, . . . ,ΣN .
We show that the scheme Σ constructed in this way is d-multiplicative if ∆ is of type Qd.
I Theorem 4. Let F be a finite field with |F| > n. Let Π = (P1, . . . , P`) be a partition of
P and ∆ be a Π-partite Qd-adversary structure on P . Write max ΦΠ(∆) = {a1, . . . ,aN}.
Then there exists a ∆-private d-multiplicative F-linear secret sharing scheme Σ such that
σ(Σ) = nN .
Proof. First, we define some notations. For each i ∈ P , let `i ∈ [`] be the unique index
such that i ∈ P`i . Since ∆ is of type Qd, it holds that aj1 + · · ·+ ajd  ΦΠ(P ) for any j =
(j1, . . . , jd) ∈ [N ]d. In particular, there exists an index k such that aj1(k)+· · ·+ajd(k) < |Pk|.
Thus, we can define a map ψ : [N ]d → [`] such that aj1(ψ(j)) + · · ·+ ajd(ψ(j)) < |Pψ(j)| for
any j = (j1, . . . , jd) ∈ [N ]d. For each j = (j1, . . . , jd) ∈ [N ]d, we fix a subset P˜j ⊆ Pψ(j) of
size aj1(ψ(j)) + · · ·+ ajd(ψ(j)) + 1. Note that `i = ψ(j) if i ∈ P˜j . Furthermore, we define
Ji := {j ∈ [N ]d : i ∈ P˜j} for i ∈ P .
Let Σ be the above secret sharing scheme. From the construction of Σ, any share assigned
to i ∈ P for a secret s has the form of (f1`i(αi), . . . , fN`i(αi)), where each fj`i is a polynomial
of degree at most aj(`i) and s = f1`i(0) + · · ·+ fN`i(0). For any k 6= k′ ∈ [`], the schemes
Σjk and Σjk′ have the same secret as inputs and hence it holds that fjk(0) = fjk′(0).
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Let s(1), . . . , s(d) be any d secrets. For m ∈ [d], let (f (m)1`i (αi), . . . , f
(m)
N`i
(αi)) be a share
assigned to i ∈ P for the secret s(m). Since f (m)jk (0) have the same value for all k ∈ [`], we
denote the common value by s(m)j . Then it holds that s(m) = s
(m)
1 + · · ·+ s(m)N .
Note that, for any j = (j1, . . . , jd) ∈ [N ]d and k = ψ(j), the product
∏
m∈[d] f
(m)
jmk
is a
polynomial of degree at most
∑
m∈[d] ajm(k) and P˜j is a subset of size
∑
m∈[d] ajm(k) + 1.
Thus, by Lagrange interpolation, for any j = (j1, . . . , jd) ∈ [N ]d, it holds that
s
(1)
j1
· · · s(d)jd = f
(1)
j1,ψ(j)(0) · · · f
(d)
jd,ψ(j)(0) =
∑
i∈P˜j
λ
P˜j
i f
(1)
j1`i
(αi) · · · f (d)jd`i(αi),
where λP˜ji is a lagrange coefficient, i.e., λ
P˜j
i =
∏
k∈P˜j\{i} αk/(αk − αi).
Now we have
s(1) · · · s(d) =
∑
j=(j1,...,jd)∈[N ]d
s
(1)
j1
· · · s(d)jd
=
∑
j∈[N ]d
∑
i∈P˜j
λ
P˜j
i f
(1)
j1`i
(αi) · · · f (d)jd`i(αi)
=
∑
i∈P
∑
j∈Ji
λ
P˜j
i f
(1)
j1`i
(αi) · · · f (d)jd`i(αi).
For i ∈ P with Ji = ∅, the corresponding sum is assumed to be 0. Therefore, the d-
multiplicativity follows by defining MULT : P × Sd → F as
MULT(i, (γ(1)1 , . . . , γ
(1)
N ), . . . , (γ
(d)
1 , . . . , γ
(d)
N )) =
∑
j=(j1,...,jd)∈Ji
λ
P˜j
i γ
(1)
j1
· · · γ(d)jd . J
Since N = |max ΦΠ(∆)| is clearly at most |ΦΠ(2P )| = O(n`), we can obtain a ∆-private
d-multiplicative secret sharing schemes with information ratio O(n`+1) for any `-partite
Qd-adversary structure ∆. Although the CNF scheme for ∆ is also d-multiplicative, the
information ratio
∑
i∈P |∆+i | is exponential in n. Indeed, the set of all maximal subsets ∆+
contains at least all subsets A such that ΦΠ(A) = a1. Therefore, we have
|∆+i | ≥
(|P`i | − 1
a1(`i)
) ∏
k∈[`]\{`i}
( |Pk|
a1(k)
)
.
I Example 5. We apply Theorem 4 to a family of bipartite adversary structures. Suppose
that the number of servers an adversary can corrupt is at most k. Equivalently, suppose
that the adversary structure ∆ corresponding to the adversary satisfies ∆ ⊆ T nk . If n > dk,
Shamir’s scheme can tolerate the maximal adversary ∆ = T nk . In the case of d(k−1) < n ≤ dk,
it is no longer possible to make d-multiplicative schemes secure against an adversary who
can corrupt any k servers since T nk is not of type Qd. On the other hand, d-multiplicative
secret sharing can still tolerate any k − 1 corrupted servers. It is natural to ask how many
subsets of size k we can add to ∆ under the condition that ∆ ⊇ T nk−1. Then, for n = dk − r
with 0 ≤ r < d− 1,1 we define the following (S, P \ S)-partite adversary structure Bnk (S) for
a subset S ⊆ P of size (d− r)k − 1:
Bnk (S) = T nk−1 ∪ {A ⊆ P : |A| = k and A ⊆ S}.
1 When r = d− 1 and n = d(k− 1) + 1, T nk−1 ∪ {B} is not of type Qd for any subset B of size k. In other
words, T nk−1 is the only Qd-adversary structure ∆ such that ∆ ⊇ T nk−1.
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This adversary structure corresponds to the situation in which the adversary can corrupt any
k− 1 servers in P and any k servers in S. It can be shown that Bnk (S) is actually of type Qd
and is maximal in the sense that Bnk (S)∪ {B} is not of type Qd for any subset B /∈ Bnk (S) of
size k (see Appendix A).
It can be seen that max ΦΠ(Bnk (S)) = {(k, 0)} ∪ {(x, k − 1 − x) : x = 0, 1, . . . , k − 2}
if 0 < r < d − 1 and max ΦΠ(Bnk (S)) = {(k, 0), (k − 2, 1)} if r = 0. From Theorem 4, we
obtain a Bnk (S)-private d-multiplicative secret sharing scheme whose information ratio is kn
if d(k − 1) + 1 < n < dk and 2n if n = dk. The scheme can be defined over any finite field F
with |F| > n.
4 d-Multiplicative Secret Sharing for `-Partite Adversary Structures
with Good Geometric Properties
Let ∆ be a Π-partite adversary structure. We show that there exists a more efficient ∆-private
d-multiplicative scheme than the above general construction if the associated set of integer
points ΦΠ(∆) has some good geometric property.
Let C = Conv(ΦΠ(∆)) be the convex hull of ΦΠ(∆) in R`. The convex hull of a finite set
S = {x1, . . . ,xN} is defined by
Conv(S) =

N∑
j=1
αjxj : ∀j ∈ [N ], αj ≥ 0 and
N∑
j=1
αj = 1
 .
Set p := (1/d)ΦΠ(P ). Assume that p /∈ C. The hyperplane separation theorem [13, Theorem
4.4] states that there exists a vector h such that h · (c−p) < 0 for any c ∈ C. Then there do
not exist x1, . . . ,xd ∈ ΦΠ(∆) such that x1 + · · ·+xd = ΦΠ(P ) since, otherwise, it would hold∑
i∈[d] h · (xi−p) = 0. In short, an adversary structure ∆ is of type Qd if p /∈ Conv(ΦΠ(∆)).
Furthermore, since C is closed, there exists some  > 0 such that ‖p− c‖ ≥  for any c ∈ C.
For an adversary structure ∆ with dist(p, C) ≥  > 0, we construct a ∆-private d-
multiplicative secret sharing scheme whose information ratio is at most O(`n2/) based
on weighted threshold secret sharing. For example, if  is a constant independent of n,
the information ratio is much smaller than those of the schemes from the above general
construction, which is O(n`+1).
To begin with, we show that the convex hull C is also monotone decreasing. Specifically,
for any c ∈ C, the hyperrectangle determined by 0 and c is included in C.
I Lemma 6. Let Π = (P1, . . . , P`) be a partition of P and ∆ be a Π-partite adversary
structure. Let C = Conv(ΦΠ(∆)) be the convex hull of ΦΠ(∆) in R`. If c ∈ C and
0  c′  c, then c′ ∈ C.
Proof. Let c ∈ C and represent it as a convex combination of some points of ΦΠ(∆):
c =
∑
i αixi, where
∑
i αi = 1 and αi ≥ 0. Then, for any A ⊆ [`], c(A) =
∑
i αixi(A) and
hence c(A) ∈ C. Here, for a vector v ∈ R` and A ⊆ [`], v(A) denotes the vector whose entries
indexed by A are the same as those of v and 0 otherwise. If we set X := {c(A) : A ∈ 2[`]}, it
holds that Conv(X) ⊆ C since C is convex.
We finish the proof by showing that Conv(X) = {x ∈ R` : 0  x  c}. Let x ∈ R` with
0  x  c. Set Z = {i ∈ [`] : c(i) 6= 0} and write {x(i)/c(i) : i ∈ Z} = {v1, . . . , vm}, where
v0 := 0 ≤ v1 < · · · < vm ≤ 1. Furthermore, for j ∈ [m], set Ij = {i ∈ Z : x(i)/c(i) = vj}
and Aj = Ij ∪ Ij+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Im. Let y be a vector such that y(i) = x(i)/c(i) for i ∈ Z
and otherwise y(i) = 0. Then we have y =
∑m
j=1(vj − vj−1)1(Aj), from which we obtain
x =
∑m
j=1(vj − vj−1)c(Aj) + (1− vm)c(∅). Thus, x ∈ Conv(X). The other inclusion clearly
holds. J
ITC 2020
2:12 d-Multiplicative Secret Sharing for Multipartite Adversary Structures
Figure 1 The convex hull of ΦΠ(∆) in R`.
Next, we show that if we set h as the unit vector parallel to p− c∗ for the closest point
c∗ ∈ C to p, then h · (p− x) ≥ dist(p, C) for any x ∈ ΦΠ(∆). Although the existence of h
easily follows from the hyperplane separation theorem, we additionally show that h ∈ R`+
using the fact that C is monotone decreasing. The vector h is used to find a weight vector
w such that ∆ ⊆ WΠw,t.
I Lemma 7. Let Π = (P1, . . . , P`) be a partition of P and ∆ be a Π-partite adversary
structure. Set p = (1/d)ΦΠ(P ). Let C = Conv(ΦΠ(∆)) be the convex hull of ΦΠ(∆) in R`.
Suppose that dist(p, C) ≥  > 0, i.e., ‖c− p‖ ≥  for any c ∈ C. Then there exists a vector
h ∈ R`+ with ‖h‖ = 1 such that h · (p− x) ≥  for any x ∈ ΦΠ(∆).
Proof. Let c∗ = argminc∈C‖p− c‖ and set h0 = p− c∗. Note that ‖h0‖ ≥ .
Then h0 · (p− c) ≥ ‖h0‖2 for any c ∈ C. Indeed, let c be any point in C. For λ with
0 < λ < 1, we define a point cλ as cλ = λc+ (1− λ)c∗. It follows from the definition of c∗
that ‖cλ − p‖2 ≥ ‖c∗ − p‖2. This implies that 0 ≥ −λ‖c− c∗‖2 + 2(c∗ − p) · (c∗ − c). By
making λ approach to 0, we obtain h0 · (c∗ − c) ≥ 0, which implies that
h0 · (p− c) = h0 · (p− c∗) + h0 · (c∗ − c) ≥ ‖h0‖2.
We show that h0 ∈ R`+. Assume that c∗  p. Then there is an index j ∈ [`] with
c∗(j) > p(j). Set c′ = c∗− (c∗(j)−p(j))ej . Since 0  c′  c∗, c′ is in C. However, it holds
that
‖c′ − p‖2 − ‖c∗ − p‖2 = −(c∗(j)− p(j))2 < 0,
which contradicts the definition of c∗.
Set h = h0/‖h0‖ ∈ R`+. Then ‖h‖ = 1 and h · (p− x) ≥ ‖h0‖ ≥  for any x ∈ ΦΠ(∆) ⊆
C. J
To obtain a weight vector w, we approximate h by a vector of rational numbers h+ δ for
a small vector δ and set w = q(h+ δ) for some integer q. Since h · (p− x) ≥  for a finite
number of vectors x ∈ ΦΠ(∆), we can choose q to be q = O(`n/).
I Lemma 8. In the setting of Lemma 7, let h be a vector of R`+ with ‖h‖ = 1 such that
h·(p−x) ≥  for any x ∈ ΦΠ(∆). Then there exists a vector w ∈ Z`+ such that w ·(x−p) < 0
for any x ∈ ΦΠ(∆) and 0 ≤ w(j) ≤ (`n/) + 1 for any j ∈ [`].
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Proof. Write ΦΠ(∆) = {x1, . . . ,xN}. Define a continuous function fj : R` → R as fj(w) =
w · (xj − p) for j ∈ [N ]. Observe that fj(h) ≤ − and that for any δ ∈ R`,
|fj(h+ δ)− fj(h)| ≤ ‖xj − p‖ · ‖δ‖ ≤
√
`n‖δ‖.
Thus, fj(h+ δ) < 0 for any δ ∈ R` with ‖δ‖ < /(
√
`n).
Let q be the smallest positive integer satisfying q > `n/. Set pj = dqh(j)e for each
j ∈ [`]. Since ‖h‖ = 1, we have 0 ≤ qh(j) ≤ q and hence 0 ≤ pj ≤ q.
Let δ ∈ R` be a vector such that
0 ≤ δ(j) = pj
q
− h(j) ≤ 1
q
.
Then ‖δ‖ ≤ ‖q−11‖ < /(√`n). Set w = q(h + δ) = (p1, . . . , p`) ∈ Z`+. It holds that
fj(w) = qfj(h+ δ) < 0 for any j ∈ [N ] and 0 ≤ w(j) ≤ q ≤ (`n/) + 1. J
Now, we construct a d-multiplicative scheme using the weight vector w in Lemma 8.
I Theorem 9. Let Π = (P1, . . . , P`) be a partition of P and ∆ be a Π-partite adversary
structure. Let C be the convex hull of ΦΠ(∆) in R`. Set p = (1/d)ΦΠ(P ). Suppose that
dist(p, C) ≥  > 0. If F is a finite field with |F| > (`n2/) + n, then there exists a ∆-private
d-multiplicative F-linear secret sharing scheme whose information ratio is at most (`n2/)+n.
Proof. From Lemma 8, we have w ∈ Z`+ such that w · (x− p) < 0 for any x ∈ ΦΠ(∆) and
0 ≤ w(j) ≤ (`n/) + 1 for any j ∈ [`]. Set t := maxx∈ΦΠ(∆){w ·x}. Clearly, w ·x ≤ t for any
x ∈ ΦΠ(∆). Furthermore, dt < w · ΦΠ(P ) since w · x < w · p for any x ∈ ΦΠ(∆). Let F be
a finite field with |F| > w · ΦΠ(P ). Then, applying Proposition 1 to the weighted threshold
adversary structure WΠw,t, we obtain ∆-private d-multiplicative secret sharing scheme over F
whose information ratio is w · ΦΠ(P ) ≤ (`n2/) + n. J
The construction of Theorem 9 is a natural generalization of Shamir’s threshold schemes.
Indeed, the convex hull C = Conv(ΦΠ(∆)) for ∆ = T nk is {x ∈ R` : 1 · x ≤ k}. Thus, the
condition p /∈ C holds if and only if n > dk. Then we can set w ∈ Z`+ in the proof of
Theorem 9 as 1 ∈ Z`+ and t = maxx∈ΦΠ(T nk ){w · x} = k. The weighted threshold secret
sharing for WΠw,t =WΠ1,k obtained from Proposition 1 is nothing but the (k, n)-Shamir secret
sharing scheme.
I Example 10. We consider the bipartite adversary structure Bnk (S) in Example 5 again.
If n = dk − r and 0 < r < d− 1, then the convex hull C = Conv(ΦΠ(Bnk (S))) is
C = {(x, y) ∈ R2 : x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, (k − 1)x+ ky ≤ k(k − 1)}.
The closest point c∗ ∈ C to p is on the line (k − 1)x + ky = k(k − 1). In particular,
c∗ − p is parallel to (k − 1, k). Therefore, we can set w ∈ Z2+ in the proof of Theorem 9
as (k − 1, k). If we set t = maxx∈ΦΠ(Bn
k
(S)){w · x} = k(k − 1), then Bnk (S) = WΠw,t. As a
result, we obtain a Bnk (S)-private d-multiplicative secret sharing scheme whose information
ratio is w · ΦΠ(P ) = dk2 − dk + 1. The scheme can be defined over any finite field F with
|F| > dk2 − dk + 1.
If n = dk, then the convex hull C = Conv(ΦΠ(Bnk (S))) is
C = {(x, y) ∈ R2 : x ≥ 0, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, x+ 2y ≤ k}.
Now, we can set w ∈ Z2+ as (1, 2) and t = maxx∈ΦΠ(Bnk (S)){w · x} = k. Therefore, we
obtain a Bnk (S)-private d-multiplicative secret sharing scheme whose information ratio is
w ·ΦΠ(P ) = dk+1 = n+1. The scheme can be defined over any finite field F with |F| > n+1.
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In both cases, the information ratios are smaller than those of the d-multiplicative schemes
in Example 5, which are kn = dk2 − rk if 0 < r < d − 1 and 2n if r = 0. However, the
schemes in Example 5 can be defined over a smaller field F such that |F| > n.
Moreover, we provide another example of adversary structures which arise in real-world
scenarios and apply Theorem 9 to them. In a naive approach based on weighted threshold
secret sharing, the obtained information ratio would grow infinitely depending on the
description of an adversary structure.
I Example 11. Suppose that a Π-partite adversary structure ∆ is described as ΦΠ(∆) =
{x ∈ ΦΠ(2P ) : a · x ≤ b} for some a and b and that a · p > b. In a real-world setting, such
∆ corresponds to a situation in which each value a(j) is the cost required to corrupt a single
server in the j-th part and b specifies the maximum tolerable cost. Note that there are
infinitely many pairs (a′, b′) such that ΦΠ(∆) = {x ∈ ΦΠ(2P ) : a′ · x ≤ b′} since ΦΠ(∆) is a
finite subset in R`.
If a ∈ Z`+, then we have ∆ ⊆ WΠa,t and dt < a · ΦΠ(P ) for t = maxx∈ΦΠ(∆){a · x}.
Hence, we immediately obtain a ∆-private d-multiplicative scheme whose information ratio is
a · ΦΠ(P ). However, a is not necessarily a vector of non-negative integers. One may have a
good rational approximation a˜ of a and set w = N a˜ ∈ Z`+ for some N . Nevertheless, as the
complexity of a increases, N would grow infinitely, which results in a large information ratio.
From Theorem 9, we can construct a ∆-private d-multiplicative scheme whose information
ratio depends on the distance between the point p and the hyperplaneH = {x ∈ R` : a·x = b}
rather than the complexity of the coefficient vector a. Let C = {x ∈ R` : a · x ≤ b}. Since
C is convex, C includes Conv(ΦΠ(∆)). Thus, the distance between p and Conv(ΦΠ(∆))
is lower bounded by dist(p, H). In other words, for any c ∈ Conv(ΦΠ(∆)), it holds that
‖c−p‖ ≥ dist(p, H) = (a ·p−b)/‖a‖. From Theorem 9, we have a ∆-private d-multiplicative
secret sharing scheme Σ such that
σ(Σ) ≤ `n
2
dist(p, H) + n =
`n2‖a‖
a · p− b + n.
To explicitly obtain secret sharing schemes from Theorem 9, we have to find the vector
h = (p− c∗)/‖p− c∗‖ in Lemma 7, where c∗ is the closest point in C = Conv(ΦΠ(∆)) to p.
For that purpose, we can make use of (hard margin) support vector machine [22]. Note that,
since C is convex, the vector h is characterized by the condition h · (p − x) ≥ , ∀x ∈ C,
where  = dist(p, C). Set a training data set D as D = {(x,−1) : x ∈ ΦΠ(∆)} ∪ {(p, 1)}.
Consider the following quadratic programming problem with respect to w ∈ R` and b ∈ R:
minimize ‖w‖2
subject to y(w · x− b) ≥ 1, ∀(x, y) ∈ D.
It holds that h·x−(h·p−/2) ≤ −/2 for any x ∈ ΦΠ(∆), which means that ((2/)h, (2/)h·
p − 1) is a feasible solution to the problem. On the other hand, for any feasible solution
(w, b), we have C ⊆ {x ∈ R` : w ·x−b ≤ −1} and hence  ≥ 2/‖w‖, that is, ‖w‖ ≥ ‖(2/)h‖.
Therefore, the optimal solution (w∗, b∗) is given by ((2/)h, (2/)h · p− 1). Then we obtain
the vector h by computing h = w∗/‖w∗‖.
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2:16 d-Multiplicative Secret Sharing for Multipartite Adversary Structures
A The Bipartite Adversary Structure Bnk (S)
I Proposition 12. Let k, d, r be integers such that k ≥ 1, d ≥ 2, and 0 ≤ r < d − 1,
respectively. Set n = dk−r. For any subset S ⊆ P of size (d−r)k−1, the bipartite adversary
structure Bnk (S) is of type Qd.
Proof. Assume that P is covered by some pairwise disjoint d subsets A1, . . . , Ad in Bnk (S).
Since n = (d − r)k + r(k − 1) and |Ai| ≤ k for any i ∈ [d], we may assume that the first
d − r subsets A1, . . . , Ad−r are of size k and the other subsets Ad−r+1, . . . , Ad are of size
k − 1. From the definition of Bnk (S), A1, . . . , Ad−r are pairwise disjoint subsets of S and,
in particular, |S| ≥ |A1|+ · · ·+ |Ad−r|. However, S is a set of size (d− r)k − 1, which is a
contradiction. J
I Proposition 13. Continuing the notation of Proposition 12, Bnk (S) ∪ {B} is not of type
Qd for any subset B /∈ Bnk (S) of size k.
Proof. If B is a subset of size k such that B /∈ Bnk (S), then |S \ B| ≥ (d − r − 1)k. Then
we can partition S \ B into pairwise disjoint d − r − 1 subsets B2, . . . , Bd−r of size k. By
partitioning P \ (B ∪B2 ∪ · · · ∪Bd−r) into r subsets Bd−r+1, . . . , Bd each of size k − 1, we
obtain B ∪B2 ∪ · · · ∪Bd = P , which means Bnk (S) ∪ {B} is not Qd. J
